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Abstract Internet platform providers (IPPs) have the potential of reaching every
online user of copyrighted works and of enhancing the licensing efficiency of
copyrighted works. This chapter explores legal mechanisms to transform this
potential into reality: an obligation on copyright holders to issue license to active
IPPs, an obligation on passive IPPs to acquire license from collective management
organizations (CMOs) and the oversight over IPPs. It then discusses the desirability
of cooperation among IPPs and CMOs. It concludes by venturing to advocate
an international agreement that would facilitate global licensing of copyrighted
works.
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1 Introduction
The Internet is accessed through a wide range of platform providers, which include
Internet service providers (ISP) in the narrower sense (browsers and search engines
such as Google), telecom service providers (fixed or mobile, such as AT&T,
Deutsche Telecom, and Vodafone), aggregators of services (such as the numerous
apps put onto iPhones by Apple), multi-media (including written, audio, video and
audiovisual content, such as iTunes, Netflix, SIPX, and TuneCore), and social
media (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter). IPPs (or ISPs in the broader sense) can
be copyright holders, CMOs (such as CELAS), and commercial licensees and
therefore cooperate with or compete against copyright holders (their CMOs)
and/or incumbent commercial exploiters of copyrighted works.
IPPs have the great potential of reaching every online user of copyrighted works
from anywhere and of enhancing the licensing efficiency of copyrighted works and
reducing transaction costs. Thus, the “question is how best to realize the full
potential of the Internet both as a legitimate market place for works and as a vehicle
for streamlining licensing transactions.1” This chapter explores legal mechanisms
to transform this potential into reality. Section 2 explains why and how the Internet
and mobile communication devices have become game changers in the realm of
copyright licensing. Section 3 depicts the tragic phenomenon of how individuals
and IPPs are being mired in legal battles brought by right holders. Section 4
discusses the legal intervention required to make IPPs work, namely two kinds of
non-voluntary copyright licensing and the oversight over IPPs. Section 5 ponders
over the merits of cooperation among IPPs and CMOs respectively. Section 6
concludes with a probe into a possible international agreement that would facilitate
global licensing of copyrighted works.
2 Internet and Mobile Communication Devices as Game
Changer
2.1 Direct and Individual Licensing Once Again Practicable
The licensing of copyright started from individually negotiated agreements. With
the proliferation of copyrights and protected contents and wide-spread, cross-
border exploitation of copyrighted works, the licensing of copyright became col-
lective, feasible only through CMOs, which can help significantly reduce the
transaction costs of licensing and managing of copyrighted works, if they function
properly.2 The rise of the Internet and the ubiquitous penetration of mobile
1S. Perlmutter (2014), 50.
2For more discussion see the chapter by S. Ne´risson.
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communication devices, especially smart phones, make direct and individual
licensing to end users once again practicable. Nowadays almost everyone sub-
scribes to one or several IPPs and pays a fee to access the Internet under their real
name, as the popularity of online payment demands.
Also due to the Internet and mobile communication devices creators are
regaining access to their fans. Websites of individual or aggregate creators acces-
sible to their fans make direct sale, fair trade, license or subscription of contents
possible. As an example, in Taiwan indievox.com sells independent music
(non-Big-Four labels3) with 3000 bands joining and charging different prices.4 In
addition, social media on the Internet are also becoming platforms for content
creators to get exposure, and for new trends and markets. While copyright holders
may form their own IPPs, IPPs formed by non-copyright owners can acquire
copyrights or licenses and sublicense them out to end users. In the US, for example,
DMX contracts directly with individual music composers and their publishers to
reduce the cost of business associated with blanket licenses of ASCAP (The
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers) and BMI (Broadcast
Music, Inc.) and undermines the revenue of those licenses as streaming becomes
popular.5
As a result of direct licensing, traditional CMOs are becoming less indispensable
and sometimes even redundant.
2.2 Transparency Can Be Better Expected
CMOs are oftentimes plagued with downsides; setting the abuse of market domi-
nance issue aside, opaqueness in operation and underpayment of the actual creators
are the two eminent ones. As the US Copyright Office reports in the 2015 “Copy-
right and the Music Market Place” study, “a paramount concern of songwriters and
recording artists is transparency in reporting and payment. As digital licensing deals
multiply and increase in complexity, it can become quite difficult to follow the
money. Songwriters and artists want to ensure that they understand the royalty
scheme, are able to track the use of their works, and are paid what they are owed”.6
3According to Wikiwand, Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, EMI Group (now a part of
Universal Music Group (recording) and Sony/ATV Music Publishing (publisher)) and Warner
Music Group are collectively known as the “Big Four” labels, available at: https://www.wikiwand.
com/en/Music_industry.
4To download a single, one needs to pay a royalty ranging between NT$ 19 and 25 (1 US$ equals
33 NT$), available at: www.indievox.com/.
5I.L. Pitt (2015), vii.
6US Copyright Office (2015), 187.
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Operational opaqueness leads to corruption.7 In addition, high administrative
costs are commonly associated with CMOs,8 alienating copyright to benefit com-
mercial intermediaries rather than the actual creators. Ill-functioning CMOs would
render the continuous expansion of copyright, especially through Free Trade
Agreements in the post-TRIPS era, a senseless legal pursuit and copyright law
“omnipresent, distracting, irrelevant.9”
In contrast, IPPs have the technical capability to keep track of subscribers’ use of
contents and are also actually collecting data about that usage, which if properly
utilized can provide the ultimate transparency, accountability, and efficiency that
were previously unthinkable. With transparent book-keeping and auditing come
much faster royalty calculation, payment and distribution.10 “The digital revolution
. . . offers substantial opportunities to reduce, virtually to the costs of electricity, the
transaction costs. . . thus making it possible for revenues to be returned to creators
with a degree of perfection unavailable even to the collecting societies.11”
3 Individuals and IPPs Mired in Legal Battles Waged by
Right Holders
Unfortunately, instead of embracing Internet as a liberating and enabling instru-
ment for fulfilling the purpose of copyright law, i.e. effective dissemination of
works and fair compensation of creators, copyright holders have sued IPPs for
indirect, contributory and/or joint infringement of copyright the world over. In the
US, where such lawsuits are most prevalent, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) has sued the following major peer-to-peer (P2P) companies one
after the other beginning with the 1999 suit against Napster: Scour, Aimster,
AudioGalaxy, Morpheus, Grokster, Kazaa, iMesh, and LimeWire. Although
RIAA has won most of these legal battles, it is still losing the war. Right after an
existent P2P was shut down, new networks quickly appeared. Alternatively, RIAA
took a different strategy since 2008 and attempted to work with ISPs to persuade
them to adopt a three-strikes-and-you’re-out system for unauthorized file sharing:
first two warnings before cutting off Internet service at the third offense, a tactic as
controversial as ineffective.
7One notorious extreme is the Italian CMO, Societa´ Italiana degli Autoro ed Editorie (SIAE)
which reported losses of US$ 53 million in 1999 even though collections were up. SIAE later again
made a US$ 52.3 million loss by investing in Lehman Brothers when the latter went broke in 2008;
see W. Patry (2011), 181–182.
8E.g. the Copyright Clearance Center in the US earns a 15% commission and 15% administrative
fee on revenue it collects, see: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_Clearance_Center.
9Borrowing from the subtitle of the book “Intellectual Property – omnipresent, distracting,
irrelevant” by W. Cornish (2004).
10I. Pitt (2015), 162.
11P. Goldstein (2015), 153–154.
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RIAA’s legal assault was later expanded to target Internet users in the
US. Although the anonymity of netizens makes the revealing of their names and
addresses difficult, RIAA resorted to a special subpoena power of the 1998 Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to force ISPs to hand over such information.
Between August and September 2003,12 RIAA issued more than 1500 subpoenas to
ISPs in the US.13 In September 2003, RIAA sued 261 American music fans for
sharing songs on P2P networks. Within 5 years, RIAA has filed, settled, or
threatened legal actions against at least 30,000 individuals. Most lawsuit targets
settle their cases for amounts ranging between $3000 and $11,000.14 But suing
music fans has proven to be an ineffective response to P2P file-sharing which is
more popular than ever. The lawsuit campaign has not resulted in any royalties to
artists.15 RIAA announced in 2008 that it would stop suing consumers directly.16
The failure of RIAA’s lawsuits did not prevent copyright holders from targeting
individual online users. The most recent example is the lawsuit filed by Dallas
Buyers Club LLC (DBCL)17 and Voltage Pictures LLC on 14 October 2014 in the
Federal Court of Australia against iiNet Limited (iiNet) and 6 other ISPs, claiming
that DBCL et al. had identified account holders (4726 IP addresses) who had
infringed the copyright on their film by sharing the film online using BitTorrent,
and seeking preliminary discovery of the identity of each of those account holders,
as those account holders might either be infringing the applicants’ copyright, or
may be able to help the applicants in identifying the actual infringers. While
granting DBCL’s application, Justice Perram stayed the order and imposed condi-
tions to address concerns about speculative invoicing.18 In a parallel effort, DBCL
12On 19 December 2003, in RIAA v. Verizon, 351 F. 3d 1229 (D.C. Circuit 2003) the D.C. Appeals
Court ruled that the DMCA subpoena provision did not authorize RIAA’s “driftnet fishing” tactics,
overturned the lower court ruling, and found that the DMCA subpoenas were available only where
the allegedly infringing material was stored on the ISPs’ own computers, not for situations
involving P2P file-sharing where the material was stored on a subscriber’s individual computer.
13Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), 3.
14Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), 5.
15Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), 1.
16B. Slattery (2008).
17Dallas Buyers Club is a 2013 American biographical drama film, co-written by Craig Borten and
Melisa Wallack, directed by Jean-Marc Valle´e.
18Speculative invoicing is a practice which commonly involves sending intimidating letters of
demand to alleged infringers seeking significant sums for an alleged infringement by threatening
court action if the sums are not paid. To prevent speculative invoicing, DBCL was asked to submit
to Justice Perram a draft of any letter it proposes to send to account holders associated with the IP
addresses which have been identified. DBCL provided copies of the proposed letters, which
included four demands: payment for the cost of purchasing a copy of the film (payment cost);
payment of a license fee by each uploader (license fee); punitive damages depending on any other
copyrighted works that person had downloaded (additional damages); and cost of DBCL’s
expenditure in obtaining the details of each infringer (expenditure fee). DBCL’s application that
the stay be lifted was dismissed because Justice Perram found that DBCL’s demands beyond the
payment of cost and expenditure fee (permissible heads of damage) were not acceptable. For
details see Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited [2015] FCA 317 (April 7, 2015) and
838 (August 14, 2015). K.A. Hayne / A. Fehrenbach (2015).
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identified more than 500 Singapore Internet protocol addresses from subscribers of
the three major ISPs and has obtained an order from the High Court to compel all
three ISPs to release the details of subscribers linked to the IP addresses in question.
In April 2015 DBCL sent out letters to Internet users in Singapore asking for a
written offer of damages and costs within 3 days of receiving the letter.19
Obviously, speculative invoicing is hurting netizens, and especially so in coun-
tries where statutory damages are foreseen and courts have no discretion not to
apply them to minor cases.20
4 Legal Intervention Required to Materialize IPPs’
Potentials
To cope with the problems derived from online licensing of copyrighted works, a
diverse range of solutions has been proposed throughout the last 15 years, starting
from the establishment of a global Internet licensing agency,21 a fair copyright
system,22 and the so-called “reverse liability rule”,23 to voluntary and compulsory
license schemes. The Electronic Frontier Foundation advocates a voluntary collec-
tive licensing regime as a mechanism that would fairly compensate artists and
rights holders for P2P file sharing: the music industry forms one or more collecting
societies, which then offers file sharing music fans the opportunity to “get legit” in
19See Dallas Buyers Club case: Uphill task to sue users, say lawyers, available at: www.straitstimes.
com/singapore/courts-crime/dallas-buyers-club-case-uphill-task-to-sue-users-say-lawyers.
20In the US, statutory damages, written into the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages
Improvement Act of 1999, are between US$ 750 and US$ 30,000 per work or US$ 750 and US$
150,000 per work if willful. In Singapore statutory damages can go up to S$ 10,000 per title per
person (Section 119 (2)(d) of the Copyright Act). In the 2016 “White Paper on Remixes, First Sale,
and Statutory Damages,” the US Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force sets forth
its conclusions on the appropriate calibration of statutory damages in the contexts of individual file
sharers and secondary liability for large-scale infringement. The White Paper recommends
amending the Copyright Act to incorporate a list of factors for courts and juries to consider
when determining the amount of statutory damages. In addition, it advises changes to remove a bar
to eligibility for the Act’s “innocent infringer” provision, and to lessen the risk of excessively high
statutory damages in the context of secondary liability for online service providers. See ntia.doc.
gov/press-release/2016/commerce-recommends-amendments-copyright-act.
21J. Sterling, (2010), 295.
22L. Hilman (2013). Such fair trade copyright would encourage users to donate to recording artists
on digital platforms and distribute the donations to artists.
23Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola advocate the idea of allowing copyright owners a choice
between a compulsory license and a reverse liability rule. Under the reverse liability rule,
copyright owners can block the use of their works by paying a fee to the government fund that
would in return financier some other works. See K. McLeod / P. DiCola (2011), 265. The idea was
also picked up by Dan Burk in the realm of patent law, according to which a patentee who wishes
to enforce his patent rights disregarding FRAND terms has a right to injunction only if he pays the
costs of the competitor who needs to adopt an alternative technology. See D. Burk (2013), 7.
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exchange for a reasonable regular payment. So long as they pay, the fans are free to
keep doing what they are going to do anyway.24 In the literature, compulsory
license model complemented by levy arrangement has also been suggested.25
None of these initiatives has been adopted by legislators or markets.26
As an alternative, this chapter seeks to capitalize on the potential of IPPs, and
suggests two kinds of non-voluntary copyright licensing with reasonable royalty
rather than levy to make IPPs work.27 As accepted by more and more people,
copyright in its exclusive form is not up to the challenges we are now facing, and
has to be reformed in a way that is working with and not against the technical and
business advancement of the Internet. The Internet has becomes hugely popular
because it follows the social fact that people like to borrow and share words, ideas,
sounds, and images.28 Copyright law of the online world should address these
demands and eradicate barriers to market entry in the copyright industries.29
“Copyright entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.”30,31 Such
obligation can take the form of compulsory license if it is perceived that negotiation
between parties is nevertheless necessary; it can also be stipulated as statutory
license if it is acknowledged that negotiation between parties is redundant.32
Non-voluntary licensing over the medium to longer term can only benefit right
holders, as it expands the base for licensing exponentially and encourages innova-
tive usage. As a result, non-voluntary licensing can generate much more than
enough revenues to offset the initial losses from not being able to charge as much
as right holders would have. “Substantial financial rewards can come from giving
up some control, in the form of liability rules. This is a lesson the music industry
might want to contemplate as it struggles to adjust to new technologies33”. To
borrow from Daniel Gervais, “Historically, copyright industries have done well,
24Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), 13.
25L. Hilman (2013), 191, 194 et seq.
26According to L. Hilman (2013), 195, “Complexity might have been the main barrier for
implementation. Too many participants, interests and agendas need to be settled in order to
make such systems feasible.”
27However, Goldstein is of the opinion that transaction costs are not immutable and can be reduced
through institutional innovation to such a level that non-voluntary copyright licensing could not be
justified, see P. Goldstein (2015), 153.
28K. McLeod / P. DiCola (2011), 266.
29For similar opinions see the chapters by R. Mittal and by M.R.F. Senftleben.
30This follows the spirit of Article 14(2) of the German Basic Law which provides: “Property
entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.”
31For similar opinion see W. Patry (2011), 262: “Copyright owners should also support the good
guys by providing reasonably priced, convenient authorized goods. If they don’t, no copyright law
can help them.”
32For similar opinions and more discussion see the chapters by H. Sun, W.L. Ng-Loy and
C. Geiger.
33K. McLeod / P. DiCola (2011), 262.
Individual Licensing Models and the Role of Internet Platform Providers 233
one could argue, when the primary focus was not to minimize unauthorized uses but
rather to maximize authorized use.34”
4.1 Two Kinds of Non-voluntary Licensing Needed
4.1.1 Copyright Holders (and CMOs) Have to Grant Licenses
to Active IPPs
IPPs can actively broker between copyright holders and online end users of
copyrighted works by offering related services. In that capacity, IPPs will have to
acquire licenses from copyright owners or their CMOs and thereby compete against
them. Faced with competition, copyright owners or their CMOs are tempted to
refuse to license or exercise “price squeeze” to drive IPPs out. To prevent that from
happening, copyright owners that have put their copyrighted works online for use
must be imposed an obligation to grant license to any willing IPPs. CMOs are to be
subject to this obligation too if they are not already obliged by law to grant
license.35 Non-voluntary license is justified, as such copyrighted content cannot
be reasonably duplicated and constitutes the prerequisite for market entry, and the
denial of access to such content will wipe out competition in an adjacent market
(e.g. online enjoyment of copyrighted work).
The proposal was inspired by the newly revised Danish Copyright Act, effective
since October 29, 2014. Article 35(4) of the Danish Copyright Act allows licensing
of simultaneous and unaltered online retransmission, on-demand use, store TV
services and public performance, and any other possible exploitation (that is
relevant to copyright and therefore needs clearance) of TV content (linear TV
channels) via all platforms (CATV, IPTV, web TV/OTT, DTT, PC, tablets and
smart phones etc.) from broadcasters, including even foreign European broad-
casters (“Danish licenses for Europe”) by distributors to their customers under
specific extended collective license.36 Furthermore, Article 35(5) of the Danish
Copyright Act allows on-demand use of on-demand content from broadcasters
under specific extended collective license.37 As a result, the extended collective
license of Article 35(4) and (5) may be invoked by any third-party users who have
made the agreement on the exploitation of works in question with an organization
34D. Gervais (2010), 17.
35In many countries, Germany (Article 6 of the Act on the Management of Copyrights and Related
Rights [Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten]) and
Taiwan (Article 32 of the Copyright Collective Management Organization Act) for example,
CMOs may not refuse to grant license to willing users.
36Section 35(4) of the Danish Copyright Act; see T. Foged (2015), 22. Specific extended collective
license pursuant to Article 50(2) is different from general extended collective license pursuant to
Article 50(1).
37Section 35(5) of the Danish Copyright Act; see T. Foged (2015), 23.
234 K.-C. Liu
comprising a substantial number of authors (right holder organizations, which need
to be approved by the Minister of Culture) of a certain type of works which are used
in Denmark. However, if a right holder organization or a broadcaster unreasonably
refuses to consent to retransmission or on-demand use, the Copyright License
Tribunal can no longer grant such permission.38
It is conceivable that in the context of non-voluntary licensing, IPPs and
CMOs could fail to reach consensus on the reasonable royalty. Therefore a
dispute settlement mechanism such as copyright tribunal under the oversight of
courts to mediate an agreement is necessary. At any rate, before the agreement
is actually reached, right owners and CMOs shall be prevented from suing their
patrons (the individual netizens) and brokers of their works (IPPs), so long as
IPPs pay right owners or CMOs what is considered objectively fair, and deposit
the difference at the dispute settlement body for the benefit of right owners
or CMOs.
To preserve legal peace on the Internet, which is the precondition for its
continued growth, it is further suggested that the non-voluntary licensing agreement
between CMOs and IPPs should exempt all non-commercial uses and dissemination
(including reproduction, public performance, distribution, and making available to
the public) of copyrighted works by users of active IPPs.
4.1.2 Passive IPPs Must Acquire License from CMOs
IPPs can passively be used by online end users to enjoy copyrighted works through
their platforms. Such usage directly benefits IPPs, as the heightened usage of
content would trigger greater need for more paid bandwidth or ads. It’s only fair
for IPPs to share their increased revenues with right holders. However, as right
holders are numerous and hugely dispersed, IPPs should acquire a license from
CMOs, which manage online exploitation of copyrighted works, and pay them a
reasonable fee. For practical reasons, CMOs can only grant such a license through
their joint organization (more see infra Sect. 5).
When determining the reasonable share that IPPs would have to pay CMOs for
their end users, one distinction must be made: There are users who are willing to
pay extra to get access to copyrighted content, and users who are undiscerning,
used to paying a flat-rate to IPPs, and reluctant to make extra payment for any
content managed by CMOs. In the former case, users are already paying CMOs
directly. Only in the latter case would IPPs have to pay for their users, most likely
in a lump sum (percentage of the subscription fees). In return, IPPs can recoup the
payment to CMOs either through the increased ads-sponsorship that will follow
the rising lawful online use, or through charging their users higher access or
subscription fees.
38Section 35(7) of the Danish Copyright Act; see T. Foged (2015), 19.
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To preserve legal peace on the Internet, the payment to CMOs by IPPs should
also exempt all non-commercial uses and dissemination (including reproduction,
public performance, distribution, and making available to the public) of
copyrighted works by users of passive IPPs.
4.2 Oversight of IPPs as CMOs
Successful IPPs could enjoy overwhelming market power, and if unchecked would
amplify the shortcomings of traditional CMOs. One pressing issue would be the
transparency in the equity structure of IPPs which are partially held by right owners.
For instance, major labels together reportedly negotiated an 18% stake in the super
online music licensor Spotify.39 Such equity deals and whether and how the value
received by the labels will negatively impact the royalties that are to be paid to
artists and songwriters and therefore must be reported to artists and songwriters.
The prerequisite for overseeing the operation of IPPs would be to have access to
their collected data about the usage of copyrighted works, whether through down-
loads or streaming.40 Irrespective of who owns these valuable data, be it the
generators of the data,41 IPPs, or an objective third party, a basic legal principle
should be that these data must be made available to legitimate stakeholders.
In addition, the deficiency of right holders going “unpaid because there are no
industry-wide, certified accounting and auditing requirements” must be remedied to
ensure that “intermediaries are all acting in good faith”.42 Therefore, legal inter-
vention is warranted in requiring that IPPs establish standards for usage registra-
tion, accounting, and auditing and develop compatible systems that ensure the
exchangeability of data among and between IPPs and CMOs.43
39Record labels part owner of Spotify, available at: www.swedishwire.com/jobs/680-record-
labels-part-owner-of-spotify. Before the Swedish Spotify was launched a number of record
companies bought 18% of the company’s stocks: Sony BMG (5.8%), Universal Music (4.8%),
Warner Music (3.8%) and EMI (1.9%).
40I. Pitt asks similar question in the context of music works. See I. Pitt (2015), 263.
41According to the theory of the so-called “Skripturakt” adopted by the German Court of Appeal of
Nuremberg, the person who generates the data gets the right to the data. See T. Hoeren (2014), 753.
However, such a rule of thumb does not seem to fit the scenario of IPPs and CMOs.
42I. Pitt (2015), viii.
43D. Gervais (2010), 20. Noteworthy is the Linked Content Coalition (LCC, www.
linkedcontentcoalition.org): a not-for-profit global consortium of standards bodies and registries.
LCC members are organizations who create and manage data standards associated with content of
one or more types, particularly for identifiers, metadata and messaging. The purpose of the LCC is
to facilitate and expand the legitimate use of content in the digital network through the effective
use of interoperable identifiers and metadata.
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4.3 Intervention Instrument
If we agree to introduce the two kinds of non-voluntary copyright licensing and the
oversight of IPPs mentioned in the above, then the next question would be which
instrument to take? It seems that a hybrid of the application of general competition
law and copyright legislation is the right way to go. General competition law is
ideal for ex post oversight of IPPs, whereas copyright law is better suited for ex
ante, continuing and detailed regulation and oversight. In particular, procedural
copyright law, which mainly deals with the efficient exercise and management of
rights (such as the German Act on the Management of Copyrights and Related
Rights and the like) as opposed to substantive copyright law that deals with the
rights issues (coverage, terms etc.) remains the ideal intervention instrument.
5 Cooperation Among IPPs and CMOs Desirable
It would further cut the transaction costs for users, copyright holders, IPPs and
CMOs alike if a consortium of national IPPs (CIPP) or even a consortium of global
IPPs (GCIPP) can be formed. CIPP and GCIPP are warranted to counter the market
power of CMOs and/or their alliances, as CMOs usually possess market power
which is often further strengthened by cross-border agreements among CMOs.44 As
a matter of fact, IPPs are to some extent already internationally organized as
evidenced by international organizations such as the Global System for Mobile
Communications Association (GSMA45) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).
Cooperation is equally welcome on the side of CMOs. On a national level, there
is already the necessity to drastically shrink the number of CMOs to no more than
one per type of work.46 Existent CMOs could be induced to form a consortium
44One such example is the so-called Santiago Agreement by five big CMOs, namely BMI (the US),
BUMA (the Netherlands), GEMA (Germany), PRS (the UK) and SACEM (France) which was
later joined by all other CMOs within the European Economic Area—except for the Portuguese
SPA and Swiss SUISA—and legitimized by the General Court of the EU (GCEU). According to
this Agreement, each participating CMO could be the only one entitled to grant a non-exclusive
license to users established in its territory, which would be valid for all EU territories and would
cover the whole music repertoires of all participating CMOs. The EU Commission ruled that the
Agreement was a concerted practice contrary to EU competition rules, which was rejected by the
GCEU on appeal. GCEU concluded that it had not been proved that CMOs were engaging
in an anticompetitive behavior, for more see T. Woods (2010), 115–117 and the chapter by
R. Xalabarder.
45According to: www.gsma.com/aboutus, the GSMA represents the interests of mobile operators
worldwide, uniting nearly 800 operators with more than 250 companies in the broader mobile
ecosystem, including handset and device makers, software companies, equipment providers and
internet companies, as well as organizations in adjacent industry sectors.
46W. Patry (2011), 182.
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among themselves (CCMO) to further minimize transaction costs by issuing joint
licenses. A global CCMO (GCCMO) could be a reply to the interconnected
Internet, which knows no national boundaries. In fact, in addition to international
agreements (the Santiago Agreement for example) CMOs also have their associa-
tions, such as the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Com-
posers (CISAC), International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organization
(IFPRO), the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), and
the International Federation of Musicians (FIM), which are the basic constituents of
the proposed CCMO and GCCMO.
Each consortium could act as the umbrella organization and the centralized
registry of works, copyright owners, rights, and usage for all IPPs and COMs
respectively.
6 Looking Forward: An International Agreement Needed
In the interconnected world, global licensing of copyrighted works is indispensable.
Any national legislation that regulates activities taking place on the Internet would
not succeed without international cooperation. Practically speaking, “Global licens-
ing can only be accomplished by legislative and treaty action.47” The domestic
legal intervention through the two above-mentioned non-voluntary copyright
licensing mechanisms will only be successful if an international agreement on
adopting these mechanisms is reached. The TRIPS Agreement could be the ideal
vehicle to mandate that members of the TWO introduce such a mechanism and
work cooperatively to see its cross-border implementation.
Such an international agreement would have to factor in developmental differ-
ences among countries48 and foresee, in case national IPPs and CMOs failed to
reach consensus, a body in charge of the establishment of standards for recording
usage, registration (of rights, rights owners and their CMOs/agents), accounting and
auditing, data (aggregation, exchange and public access), and for determining
differentiated reasonable royalties that national IPPs have to pay foreign CMOs.
Through such an international agreement, every online user of copyrighted
works, rich or poor, can make his/her contribution, great or humble, directly or
indirectly, to the payment of right holders and eventually the sustainability of the
copyright ecology; every new market entry, innovative or imitative, will get to try
its potential; and every creator will get paid for the use of his/her digital works.
To many, such an international agreement may seem unrealistic. However,
absent such an agreement national copyright legislatures will be forced to legislate
beyond their national borders (such as the Danish licenses for Europe) in a
disarrayed and even contradictory manner, online users will be overshadowed by
47W. Patry (2011), 188.
48W. Patry (2011), 252.
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whimsical lawsuits (e.g. speculative invoicing), new market entries will be slowed
down and the distribution of copyright-generated revenues will tilt toward right
owners in countries which have functional CMOs. At the end of the day, the core of
the matter is really just about whether we can afford to think about copyright in a
global marketplace. Can we?49
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